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Excessive Personal Injury Awards;
A Problem and a Recommendation
by Anthony R. Nardi*
T HE ONE millionth American war fatality occurred in Korea,
and the one millionth American auto fatality happened in the
United States-both in December 1951.
An apparently odd coincidence assumes tragically fantastic
proportions when we pause to consider that this giant killer ac-
complished in less than fifty years what it took all wars 176 years
to do. This monstrous by-product of a civilization on wheels finds
the combined genius of America perplexed. What have men of
ability been able to resolve when added to these thousands of
instant and wanton deaths are over 1,300,000 individual disabling
bodily injuries yearly? Further, when we superimpose on this
increasing, ever-alarming frequency of destruction, attendant
higher and higher jury bodily injury awards, the American public
faces a dilemma. We are on the ascent of a vicious spiral of inde-
terminable consequences.
Thus, this query is an appropriate one: Are the rules of law
applicable to this situation productive of justice, protection, and
progress for its citizens? It should be demanded of the legal pro-
fession that it provide immediate, proper, and certain remedial
measures. In one area of this comprehensive social perplexity, it
is pertinent to analyze the question of "excessive" personal injury
awards and perhaps to evaluate where they are taking us. No
individual is spared from the highly probable cruelties of this by-
product.
When we review the fundamental rules of law applicable, it
is found that they have come to us from legal antiquity. They arose
out of needs not anticipated as in such a present-day society
wherein the average man of the masses has such a potent daily
opportunity to ruin life and property at the risk of his own per-
sonal liability! Heretofore the commoner of the multitudes by-
and-large was circumstantially prevented from civilly risking his
meager aggregation of worldly possessions. This situation is
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unique in the history of civilization. Diagnosis and prognosis must
find relevant material coming from circumstances other than
those born of the necessity of the present day.
Generalities for Computing the Correctness of the Award.
Generally speaking, it is well established in the law that a
tort-feasor is legally liable for all harm proximately caused by his
negligent act. Also, the party so injured is entitled to such an
amount of money as will compensate him for all physical dis-
abilities, pain and suffering, loss of time, inconvenience, impair-
ment of earning capacity, and expenses incurred as a direct,
necessary, and probable result of that injury. However, the
plaintiff in an automobile accident has the burden of establishing
his damages by a fair preponderance of the evidence and to a
reasonable certainty. Equally well adopted in our courts is the
recognition of the delicacy attending the measuring of a money
compensation for bodily injury and pain and suffering. All are
agreed that the amount awarded must be within reason. Failure
to do so would bring on the greatest "give-away" program of all
time and result in re-distributions of property repugnant to firmly
established laws and human conduct.
In the state courts the test of what is "excessive" has been re-
viewed under the application of many and varied rules. Here it
is of value to take only those States illustrating timely, general or
varied rules, all chosen at random to illustrate diversity.
Ohio: A verdict should not be set aside unless the dam-
ages awarded are so excessive as to appear to have been
awarded as a result of passion or prejudice, or unless it is so
manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to show a
misconception by the jury of its duties.'
Ohio: Damages awarded by a jury must be flagrantly
excessive and extravagant, or the court hearing an appeal will
not disturb the verdict.2
Ala.: In determining adequacy of damages assessed byjury, the court need not inquire and declare what wrongful
influence or failure of duty in the consideration of the case
has wrought a miscarriage of justice, but the internal evi-
dence, the verdict itself, in the light of the facts clearly dis-
closed by the evidence, usually furnishes the determining
data. 3
1 Toledo, C. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 108 Ohio St. 388, 140 N. E. 617 (1923).
Immel v. Richards, 91 N. E. 2d (Ohio App.) 548 (1949).
'Code 1940, Tit. 7, Sec. 811; Alabanma Gas Co. v. Jones, 244 Ala. 413, 13 So.
2d 873 (1943).
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Ala.: There is no limitation on the amount of an award
of damages for personal injury so long as the principle of
compensation is not violated.
4
Ark.: In determining whether jury's verdict awarding
damages for personal injuries is excessive, each case must
rest on its own peculiar facts.
5
Missouri: In determining reasonableness, consideration
should be given to economic conditions, current costs, the
purchasing power of the dollar at the time the verdict is
rendered, and the failure of the Trial Court to set aside the
verdict as excessive, and in days of inflation, a higher level
of maximum damages is warranted.6
Ark.: Ordinarily it is necessary to determine what a
given sum of money put out at interest will earn in consider-
ing the present value of future income, but local conditions
must also be considered, and that amount of interest to be
earned would vary from time to time.7
Calif.: A verdict cannot be held excessive as a matter of
law simply because amount may be larger than is allowed
ordinarily in such cases.8
Mo.: When facts as to injuries inflicted and wrongfully
sustained are similar to other cases, although never identical,
there should be a reasonable uniformity as to amount of ver-
dicts and judgments.9
N. J.: An award for prospective damages is similar to a
payment in advance, and, in fixing sum, amount should be
reduced to its present net worth.' 0
Texas: An excessive verdict does not necessarily indi-
cate that trial was unfair or that verdict was influenced by
passion or prejudice, but if the verdict is grossly excessive,
that fact may be regarded to some extent as reflecting the
jury's mind in arriving at the verdict."
Va.: Though much weight should be given to verdict in
personal injury cases, and no standard measure of damages
can be arrived at for pain and suffering, jury's finding is still
subject to control of the courts, if amount thereof bears no
reasonable relations to the damages suggested by the facts.12
'Castleberry v. Morgan, 28 Ala. App. 70, 178 So. 823 (1938).
'Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Houston, 209 Ark. 217, 189 S. W. 2d 904
(1945).
'Atn v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 243 S. W. 2d (Mo. App.) 797 (1951).
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henderson, 194 Ark. 884, 110 S. W. 2d 516 (1938).
'Power v. California Steel Cable R. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 289, 126 P. 2d 4(1943).
'Philbert v. Benjamin Anschel Co., 132 Mo. 1239, 119 S. W. 2d 797 (1938).
" Noa v. Le Gore, 131 N. J. L. 229, 35 A. 2d 691 (1944).
"Texas and N. 0. R. Co. v. Haney, 144 S. W. 2d (Texas Cir. App.) 677 (1940).
' Glass v. David Pender Grocery Co., 174 Va. 196, 5 S. E. 2d 478 (1939).
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Ariz.: The size of a verdict in a personal injury action is
not alone sufficient evidence of prejudice and passion on part
of jury.13
Ill.: Comparisons of damages awarded by jury in per-
sonal injury case with amount which would be awarded for
such injuries under Workmen's Compensation Act would
not prove that verdicts were exorbitant or excessive. 14
Mo.: The ultimate test of whether verdicts awarding
damages for personal injuries is excessive or inadequate is
amount which will fairly and reasonably compensate injured
party for his injuries.15
N. Y.: The court should not substitute its opinion for
that of the triers of the facts respecting amount of damages
unless the verdict lacks proper support in the evidence or is
so large that its excessiveness is clearly apparent. 6
Fla.: It is within the province of the court to consider
the relative degree of negligence of the parties in passing
upon the reasonableness of amount awarded. 17
Penna.: It is the duty of the Law Court to control the
amount of the verdict; it is in possession of all the facts as
well as the "atmosphere" of the case, which will enable it to
do more even-handed justice between the parties than can a
Court of Review.'
Thus, in summary it may be said that the most frequently
adopted test of excessiveness is whether the verdict was the result
of a calm and conscientious deliberation of the jury, not influenced
by passion, prejudice, or corruption. However, state courts are
now beginning to recognize the troublesome application of this
rule and are using other measures.
In some jurisdictions, in determining reasonableness, the
question will depend on local economic conditions and the current
purchasing power of the dollar,19 but in others this principle ad-
mittedly is not applicable. 20 Some courts attempt to maintain a.
uniformity as to prior adjudicated cases, 21 while others have held
that verdicts previously held excessive on approximate injuries
Keen v. Clarkson, 56 Ariz. 437, 108 P. 2d 573 (1941).
"Crane v. Railway Express Agency, 293 Ill. App. 328, 12 N. E. 2d 672 (1938);
modified, 15 N. E. 2d 866, 369 Ill. 110 (1938).
Summa v. Morgan Real Estate Co., 350 Mo. 205, 165 S. W. 2d 390 (1942).
"Kazdin v. Cooley, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 484 (1942).
Florida Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Culbreath, 96 Fla. 15, 117 So. 703 (1928).
Clark v. Horowitz, 293 Pa. 441, 143 A. 131 (1928).
"Ranum v. Swenson, 220 Minn. 170, 19 N. W. 2d 327 (1945).
Palmer v. Security Trust Co., 242 Mich. 163, 218 N. W. 677, 60 A. L. R. 1392
(1928).
" Goslin v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 395, 173 S. W. 2d 79 (1943).
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and circumstances do not imply the necessity of similar awards.22
Widely held but often disregarded is the point of view that the
presumptions are all in favor of the correctness of a verdict, and
on appeal, such inferences are aided by the decision of the trial
court in denying a motion for a new trial.2 3 Yet we find the final
responsibility of determining whether the award is excessive or
not rests with the appellate court, subject to the rule that the jury
is accorded wide latitude and elastic discretion in assessing the
amount of damages. 24 Becoming more prevalent, however, is the
thinking that the court's only method of measuring a verdict to
determine whether or not it was influenced by passion or prej-
udice is by comparing it with the evidence rather than with
amounts involved in other cases more or less practically the same.
In essence, then, courts are concluding that adjudicated cases are
of little help.
It would seem that the clearest principle that can be derived
from the cases on the subject of inadequate and excessive dam-
ages is that the courts are very slow to interfere with the jury in
such matters.25
Remittitur.
The principle of "remittitur" is closely allied to the problem
of excessive damages.
When the damages awarded by the jury for personal injury
are felt to be excessive, the trial court may grant a new trial unless
the plaintiff exercises the option to remit the excess and consents
to take judgment for such an amount as the court may believe an
unprejudiced jury would, under the evidence, probably find. 26
However, the general rule is that neither the trial court nor a
Court of Review is authorized to enter an absolute judgment for
any sum other than that assessed by the jury where the damages
are unliquidated unless the parties give their consent for the
purpose of preventing a new trial.27
Power v. California Street Cable Ry. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 289, 126 P. 2d 4
(1942).
Typical of such cases are Hamilton v. Hammond Lumber Co., 13 Cal. App.
2d 461, 56 P. 2d 1257 (1936).
" Gladstone v. Fortier, 22 Cal. App. 2d 1, 70 P. 2d 255 (1937).
" Isley v. McClandish, 299 Ill. App. 364, 20 N. E. 2d 890 (1939).
Rudnick v. Jacobs, 7 W. W. Harr (Del.) 348, 183 Atl. 508 (1936).
Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wisc. 379, 214 N. W. 374, 53 A. L. R. 771 (1927).
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Such an order, it is generally held, would, if permitted, invade
the province of the jury and deprive one or perhaps both of the
parties of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. Therefore,
neither the trial court nor the Court of Review has the power to
do more than to give the parties the option of waiving their con-
stitutional right, and if such consent is not given, the sole power
is to order a new trial.28
For example, where the factual questions being considered
by a jury are in near equipoise, improper argument of counsel
should be closely scrutinized, and where the damages awarded
are excessive and appear to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice, the resulting prejudice cannot be cor-
rected by remittitur; the only recourse is the granting of a new
trial. 29
Allowable Awards.
The foregoing answers the original query of what are the
tests and status for determining "excessiveness." It is now appro-
priate to look at some of the results, to analyze the well estab-
lished rules of law and to indicate where they are taking us. The
following Table is indicative of recent awards made and positive
amounts declared not excessive. It affords some insight by graphic
representation into how the courts are treating cases on review.
Lemon v. Campbell, 136 Pa. Super. 370, 7 A. 2d 643 (1939).
Book v. Erskine & Sons, Inc., 154 Ohio St. 391, 96 N. E. (2d) 289 (1951).
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Many more recent cases could have been added to the above.
However, no such Table can be constructed on modern cases
where awards have been held excessive. Exhaustive research
fails to find a single well-reasoned recent case in the United States
wherein the award for a serious permanent disabling injury of a
person with a fair degree of life expectancy has been held ex-
cessive!
Thus, we are in the process of arriving at a disturbing con-
clusion that there is no sound principle of determining "exces-
sive" verdicts. There has insidiously crept into the law the feeling
that courts and juries must restore and compensate the injured
person in every instance and peculiarity of circumstance. For at
the very heart of all these cases brought before the courts is the
tenet that, "In determining whether jury's verdict awarding dam-
ages for personal injuries is excessive, each case must rest on its
own peculiar facts." 30 We will all agree that cases are different
and that this difference must be taken into consideration. But, if
one is attempting to award proportionately and respectively for
all shades of existing differences, then one is attempting to do the
impossible. For, admittedly, our present tools for awarding
amounts of money are very crude. Only a rough correspondence
is possible.
Of all the rules applying to tests of excessiveness, the one
held to be most substantial is that Courts of Review are able to
determine the excessiveness of a verdict by comparing the amount
with the evidence. But, after reviewing many such cases, the most
troublesome questions are these: How shall it be made to appear
"that a verdict is "excessive"; can it be disclosed other than by the
amount of the verdict? For after all, the amount of the verdict is
the only method of expression by the jury.
Is There a Legal Test for Excessiveness?
What happens when the amount of the verdict is such that
"excessiveness" is not inferable from its magnitude alone? The
courts are not put in possession of any scale of measurement more
substantial or more accurate than that given to the jury. The
court cannot rely on adjudicated cases for reference. There is no
stamp of "excessiveness" upon the facts in a case, and admittedly
there is none on the magnitude of amount alone. After having
analyzed many cases held excessive in various amounts-$2,000,
" Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Houston, 209 Ark. 217, 189 S. W. 2d 904 (1945).
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$5,000, $10,000, $25,000 or $100,000-no forceful logic or note-
worthy reason compelling such distinction can be found. And,
furthermore, the issue is extended in complexity when it is re-
called that the jury has already established plaintiff's factual right
to damages by a fair preponderance of the evidence to a reasonable
certainty.
The helplessness of this position is illustrated in the following
instance. It offers no guide for future courses of conduct, but its
syllabus reads as follows:
That trial court required entry of remittitur did not indi-
cate that trial court believed jury were influenced by im-
proper motives which tainted their entire verdict with error,
but rather than trial was fair and free from error, save that
jury had mistakenly returned larger verdict than trial court
felt that evidence justified.3 1
All too often, although expressly denied, judges are replacing
the judgments of juries by those opinions they themselves hold,
feeling, in all sincerity, that their experience and qualities of
judgment must be thrown into the breach, or else naught is of
avail. Yet when this is done, the court is in essence depriving one
or perhaps both parties of the constitutional right to a trial by
jury. For it is not yet within the province of judges to say that
their experience and wisdom are superior to that of twelve men,
selected to pass judgment upon their fellow men. And, as the past
trend of events in cases determined as "excessive" is examined,
one cannot help but feel that the courts have "interfered," for it
appears that the juries by and large have built far better than
they knew!
In the many automobile cases, today's juries are being made
up of a sensitive public-uneasy in its awareness of the tragedies
caused by this most lethal device. They are attempting to com-
pensate for the horrible aftermaths. Yet, sums of money are not
the equivalent of bodily harm or emotional disturbances. All too
often their sense of righteous indignation and helplessness before
the ever increasing crescendo of personal blight leaves them no
alternative but to weigh the scales as heavily as possible in favor
of the injured person. Without guides for determining equitable
amounts, who is to say that they are in error?
Under our present conditions we can look forward to a con-
tinuation of the trends started over less than a half century ago.
'Todd v. Libby McNeill and Libby, 110 S. W. 2d (Mo. App.) 830 (1937).
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In a few recent cases, a Florida jury has awarded a train victim
$300,000 for the amputation of part of one foot; $225,000 has been
granted a California fireman injured when a truck struck his fire
apparatus; and $40,000 was awarded in a New York case for ten
hours of conscious pain and suffering.32 A jury awarded $160,000
to an infant, 13 months old, at the time of the accident for loss of
one arm above the wrist and one arm above the elbow. 3 3 In Ari-
zona a $43,436.40 award to housewife, who as a result of injuries,
had to hire help to perform her usual duties and whose loss of
earning power resulting from injuries was nominal and whose
pecuniary damages were less than $4,000, and whose injuries were
not of such nature as to permanently impair her earning power
should she at a later period endeavor to secure employment,
when it appeared that the jury allowed almost $40,000 for pain
and suffering alone, was excessive-$25,000 being adequate com-
pensation for those elements.3 4 In a recent Cleveland, Ohio, case
with a most interesting factual background, the judge hearing the
case without a jury awarded plaintiff $45,000. The injured plain-
tiff, a machinist, age 41, sustained two broken legs and head in-
juries.3 5
To summarize, in New York City, for instance, the average
personal injury verdict has almost trebled since 1940, and is still
rising.3 6
Organized forces push injury awards higher. Publicly agitat-
ing for higher verdicts, it is reported that one association of 1500
members conducts a post-graduate school pointing toward en-
abling lawyers to win the more generous award.37 Although their
purpose may be noteworthy, they are in existence only because of
the failure to provide adequate and proper scales for determining
the equitable award. This trend is indicative also of the fact that
perhaps too much of a jury's award in personal injury cases may
be based upon the skill and presentation by the plaintiff's Coun-
sel. Common sense tells us that with poor scales of value, the door
is wide open for the clever, emotional type court-room behavior.
SNATION'S BusiNEss, June '52-"And Then-Sudden Ruin"; Lester Velie.
' Armentrout v. Virginia Ry. Co., 72 F. Supp. 997 (1947).
" Standard Oil Co. of California v. Shields, 58 Ariz. 239, 119 P. 2d 116 (1941).
" Gniewkowski v. Walker & Dumas, Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, No. 624265; Judgment rendered Nov. 7, 1952.
Nation's Business, op. cit., note 32 supra.
Ibid.
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This all too often has no direct bearing upon the enforcement of
justice.
We have in the making a cynical disparagement by the public
of the legal profession as a result of being unable to solve its
proper problems. They are prone to believe seriously that this
confusion in legal standards is deliberately brought about; that
lawyers desire uncertainty because from it they derive their
living; and that finally, the "best" lawyer will obtain the highest
award.
Realistically, working against the defendant in "excessive"
cases is not only the legal skill pitted against him, that has im-
measurably aided a substantial award, but also his consideration
of the aggravated cost, time, and effort expended in litigation.
These factors coupled with the factor of uncertainty are not con-
ducive to a reasonable exercising of the right of appeal.
Insurance.
The American public is purchasing bodily injury insurance
protection to the sum of approximately a billion dollars annually.
The limits of protection purchased are woefully inadequate in
view of these higher verdicts. The trend of present insurance
cost is to increase, and proper limits of liability would cost the
American public a significant additional amount. To purchase
insurance in this amount of premium and not have adequate
protection is a national exigency.
How is this money being spent by the insurance companies?
Hundreds of thousands of personal injury cases are settled out-
side of courts by the insurance companies, but their rules for
determining a fair award are no better than those of courts of
law, because the insurance companies must follow the legal con-
cepts and levels of awards as determined by the juries of the
locality. To expend such sums on such ephemeral, intangible
grounds of ascertainment is certainly not the best way to conduct
a billion dollar industry.
Although insurance companies are often willing to settle for
a reasonable amount out of court, still in all too many cases by
the time the plaintiff's attorney takes out the cost of his investiga-
tion plus his normal contingent fee percentage, there is hardly
enough money left to make the settlement attractive. Invariably
there follow vigorous, but bitter, fruitless, and needless suits in
both trial and appellate courts. Increased litigation is also aided
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss2/5
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by the fact that the insurance companies must constantly "try"
cases in their attempts to determine the present level of a fair and
equitable award. This arises, quite understandably, because no
one is in possession of adequate scales for redressing bodily in-
juries. Thus, many cases clog our courts for no reason other
than the one of unpredictability. Summarily, in this respect we
lack a most vital principle in our laws, and that is the element of
predictability enabling us to carry on commerce in the most ex-
peditious manner.
Conclusion.
The foregoing material leads to the definite conclusion that
an improved, workable, and sensible test for "excessiveness"
must be established. It is fairly easy to confuse "excessive" with
the concept of "large" or "high" awards. In some particular in-
stances perhaps relatively larger or higher awards are proper in
today's economy. But, the bulk of over a million injury cases
is at a level fairly easy to classify and thereby to compensate
properly. When proper standards are established, then awards
become excessive when they go beyond this just and equitable
measure. Classifications and guides for the vast majority of per-
sonal injury claims will save the American public millions of dol-
lars yearly in insurance premiums. Also, prompt settlements and
decreased litigation will help immeasurably in reducing the court
work on trial and appeal.
It is fully believed that adequate rules can and will be worked
out. Presumably, these changes should be made by the citizenry
through acts of the legislatures in the various states. Some guides
to these rules can be found in the Workmen's Compensation Laws,
although these would have to be modified accordingly. Another
present-day working example is that of pension payments to dis-
abled military veterans based on their various classes of per-
centages of disabilities. Modified properly, their scales of value in
civil cases could be resolved to commuted lump sums.
It is amazing that Americans are able to resolve the problem
of the disabled veteran and the question of a "monetary compen-
sation" for his injuries, pain, suffering, and yet are unable to do
so in the courts of law for a party injured in a civil status. Why
are we able to provide scales of measurements for a disabled
veteran injured when society has placed him in a "known place
of danger" involuntarily, and yet feel that we cannot or should not
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1952
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interfere in civil cases wherein numerically greater personal in-
juries are being sustained yearly?
That all inequities and uncertainties cannot be resolved is
well known. However, the time has arrived for introducing some
element of stability in a system that is imponderable, inequitable,
and uncertain.
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